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Abstract
Fertility declines are now underway in many developing countries, and the
focus of the debate about future fertility trends is shifting from the early to the later
phases of the transition. This study examines patterns and determinants of fertility in
the developing world using UN estimates of the total fertility rates for 143 develop-
ing countries from 1950 to 2000. The main objective is to identify regularities in the
past record that may provide clues to future trends.
Three key findings emerge from this analysis. First, the pace of fertility de-
cline decelerates as countries reach the later stages of the transition. In the decade
immediately following the transition onset, fertility usually declines rapidly and with-
out interruption; but once fertility drops below about four births per woman, addi-
tional reductions occur, on average, at a substantially slower pace. Second, it is highly
unlikely that developing countries will converge on replacement fertility of 2.1 chil-
dren per woman as is often assumed in population projections. Past transition pat-
terns suggest that a significant number of countries will likely stall above 2.1 for
periods of up to decades or will approach low fertility at a very slow pace. Third, the
future course of fertility depends crucially on progress in human development and
on family planning effort. The recent experience of developing countries with rela-
tively high levels of development suggests that life expectancy near 75 years com-
bined with literacy near 95 percent is needed on average to reach replacement. Many
countries are still far from these levels of human development and have weak family
planning programs, thus making further progress through the transition difficult.
Over the past four decades reproductive behavior has changed rapidly in much of
the developing world. The average total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen by half from the
traditional six or more to around three today, and contraceptive use—once rare—is now
widespread. Between the early 1960s and the late 1990s the largest fertility declines
occurred in Asia (–52%) and Latin America (–55%) and the smallest in sub-Saharan
Africa (–15%) (United Nations 2001). Differences among countries are even larger,
with some completing the transition to replacement fertility in record time (e.g., China,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea), while others (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa) have
seen little change in reproductive behavior.
These recent fertility declines have been more rapid and pervasive than had been
expected. For example, although the medium variant projections prepared by the United
Nations Population Division in the 1970s and 1980s correctly predicted widespread
fertility declines by the 1990s, the actual levels in the 1990s were even lower than these
projections indicated for some world regions. The substantial declines that took place in
a few poor and largely agricultural countries such as Bangladesh were particularly un-
expected. Demographers and social scientists have proposed a variety of explanations
for why these fertility transitions have been so rapid, but there is no consensus and a
sometimes contentious debate among competing theories continues in the demographic
literature (see Bulatao and Casterline 2001 for a recent review).
With the spread of fertility decline through much of the developing world, the
focus of the debate about future fertility trends is shifting from the early to the later
phases of the transition. Until recently, only limited attention was given to understand-
ing the determinants of reproductive behavior in developing countries with relatively
low fertility. Conventional theories have little to say about the pace of fertility decline or
the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the transition. It is often assumed,
however, that ongoing declines will continue and that fertility near the replacement level
of about two births per woman will prevail in the long run (for various perspectives see
Caldwell 1982; Demeny 1997; National Research Council 2000). On this issue the UN
has long incorporated the views of the demographic community in its projections. Ac-
cording to the medium variant of the most recent UN projections, virtually all subre-
gions of the developing world will have ended their transitions by 2025–30 with TFRs
4at or below 2.2. The only exceptions are expected to be sub-Saharan Africa and West
Asia, where the TFR is projected to be still at 3.5 and 2.8 respectively (United Nations
2001). These assumptions about continued future fertility declines are critical to future
trends in population size. Population growth over the next few decades will substan-
tially exceed current projections if fertility declines are less rapid than now projected or
if fertility at the end of the transition remains above the replacement level (Casterline
2001a; United Nations 2001).
This study examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developing world
with particular emphasis on the later stages of the transition. The main objective is to
identify regularities in the past record that may provide clues to future trends. Key is-
sues examined include (1) the pace of fertility decline and changes in this pace over the
course of the transition, and (2) the determinants of the fertility level at the end of the
transition. We first examine the record of fertility change in the developing world over
the past half-century. Next, to help explain observed transitions, we discuss the relation-
ship between the TFR and socioeconomic indicators. In a concluding section we sum-
marize the implications for future trends in fertility.
PATTERNS OF CONTEMPORARY FERTILITY TRANSITION
Data
This analysis of past fertility trends in the developing world relies on the most
recent UN estimates of total fertility rates for 143 “less developed countries” (United
Nations 2001). This data set provides estimates as five-year averages from 1950–55 to
1995–2000 and it includes all countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Car-
ibbean (except the developed countries of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). For the
present study single-year estimates of the TFR were derived from these five-year aver-
ages with standard interpolation procedures. The onset of the transition is assumed to be
the year in which the TFR drops to 5 percent below the maximum observed level be-
tween 1950 and 2000. This threshold for entry into the transition was chosen instead of
the more common 10 percent decline used in many previous studies, to address a criti-
cism of past practice by Casterline (2001a). He correctly notes that a transition may be
5underway for a number of years before a country reaches a 10 percent decline. The 5
percent decline threshold used here minimizes this problem.1
Fertility levels in 1995–2000
In 1995–2000 the weighted average of the TFR for the developing world as a
whole is estimated at 3.1. This average is heavily influenced by the relatively low
fertility of very large countries, in particular China with a TFR of 1.8. As a result, the
unweighted average, which gives each country the same weight, is substantially higher
at 4.1. The TFRs of individual countries vary widely from a low of 1.2 in Macao to a
high of 8 in Niger. In the analysis below, the country is the unit of analysis and
unweighted averages of the TFR and other demographic and socioeconomic indica-
tors are used, because the focus is on understanding and predicting future fertility
trends for countries.
Because the large majority of developing countries have not yet reached the end
of their transitions, it is not possible to describe comprehensively the patterns that char-
acterize entire transitions in the developing world. Of course some developing coun-
tries—about one in seven (21/143)—have already reached a TFR of 2.1 or lower, in-
cluding China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and several Caribbean islands.
Unfortunately, the experience of this selected set of countries is not representative of the
developing world as a whole, and it therefore cannot be used to draw reliable conclu-
sions about future transition patterns that will occur in other countries.
Fertility patterns in countries with transitions starting
in the 1960s
Despite these limitations, valuable insights can be gained from partial transitions
observed to date. For example, the record of countries that started their transitions in the
1960s provides a useful starting point for the discussion because these transitions have
been underway for at least three decades. The fertility trends in this set of 38 countries
are plotted in Figure 1. Three key features of these transitions are evident: 1) fertility is
high until the transition begins; 2) once the transition gets underway fertility declines
fairly rapidly and tends to continue doing so; 3) the pace of decline decelerates as coun-
6tries reach the later stages of the transition. In this set of countries the annual decline in
the TFR averaged 0.15 in the early 1970s and only 0.06 in the 1990s.
These broad similarities aside, countries starting transitions in the 1960s diverge
substantially in the level and pace of fertility at all stages of the transition. Particularly
notable is the wide range in fertility in 1995–2000 from a high of 4.9 in Guatemala to
1.5 in South Korea. After three decades in transition, only eight of these 39 countries
have a TFR at or below 2.1. Rapid declines to below replacement are the exception
rather than the rule.
Pace of fertility decline
The question as to whether the pace of decline slows later in the transition can
also be examined with more recent cross-sectional data from all developing countries.
For each country the pace is measured as the annual change in the total fertility rate
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Figure 1 TFRs from 1953 to 1998 for countries with transition onsets in the 1960s
Source: United Nations 2001.
7between one quinquennium and the next. For example, the TFR for the developing world
as a whole dropped by 0.43 births between 1985–90 and 1990–95 (from 3.80 to 3.37).
The annual pace of decline for the quinquennium starting in 1985–90 is therefore 0.086
(i.e., 0.43/5). Figure 2 plots the average pace for groups of countries with different lev-
els of fertility. All observations after a country entered the transition are included. The
relationship between the level of the TFR and its pace is plotted separately for the pre-
and post-1975 periods.2
The main finding is that the pace of fertility change is positively associated with
the level of fertility: the lower the TFR, the slower the pace of change. For example,
before 1975 the average annual pace was 0.15 for countries with a TFR between 4 and 6,
but the pace was then only 0.04 for countries with a TFR between 2.0 and 2.5.
A comparison of this relationship between the pre- and post-1975 periods shows
a significantly more rapid pace before than after 1975 for countries in earlier stages of
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Figure 2 Annual pace of decline in TFR by level of TFR in transitional countries
Source: United Nations 2001.
8the transition.3 For example, transitional countries with TFRs between 4 and 6 before
1975 experienced more rapid declines than countries with TFRs between 4 and 6 after
1975.4 In contrast, this difference between the pre- and post-1975 pace did not exist for
countries with lower levels of fertility. Possible explanations are discussed below.
This cross-sectional evidence is consistent with the longitudinal pattern observed
in the group of countries whose transitions began in the 1960s (see Figure 1). Both
indicate substantial declines in the pace as the transition proceeds.
The 1990s
In the preceding analysis fertility trends were calculated from UN estimates for
the past half-century. Unfortunately, estimates for the late 1990s in many countries are
based on very limited direct information. Only a small number of developing countries
have accurate vital statistics, and in a limited number of additional countries surveys are
available after 1995. Information from the 2000 round of censuses was not yet available
when the estimates published by the United Nations (2001) were made. In many coun-
tries the estimates for 1995–2000 are therefore obtained indirectly or are projections
from earlier periods.
In the past few years results from a number of very recent DHS surveys have
become available. These new data provide useful information on fertility trends during
the 1990s. For present purposes a subset of DHS countries were selected in which two
surveys were implemented during the 1990s and in which the TFR was below 4 in the
early 1990s.5 Nine countries met these criteria and the two successive estimates of their
TFRs are presented in the first two columns of Table 1. At the time of the first survey in
the early 1990s the TFR ranged from 3.9 in Egypt to 2.5 in Kazakhstan and Turkey. At
the time of the second survey in the late 1990s or 2000 the TFR had declined in most
cases except in Turkey, where a slight rise was measured. The lowest TFR at the time of
the second survey was 2.1 in Kazakhstan and the highest was 3.5 in Egypt.
The pace of decline between the two surveys averaged 0.048 births per woman
per year. Notably, in five of the countries the pace was 0.3 or less, which is well below
the pace observed in the 1980s. The transitions in these countries have slowed dramati-
cally in the 1990s, or are close to stalling.
9The last column of Table 1 indicates the pace of fertility decline as estimated by
the UN for the period between the two DHS surveys in the 1990s. The average pace in
the UN estimates for this set of countries is 0.073, which is substantially higher than the
0.048 estimated from the DHS surveys. The cause of this difference is not clear and
could be the result of errors in one or both DHS estimates. However, it is also possible
that the UN has overestimated the pace of declines in some of these countries.
The three pieces of evidence reviewed here—trends in countries entering transi-
tions in the 1960s, cross-sectional pace at different levels of fertility, and recent trends
from DHS surveys—point to two conclusions. First, the pace of fertility decline usually
decelerates as countries progress through their transitions. This is not a particularly sur-
prising or controversial finding, but the cause of this trend is not obvious. Furthermore,
the reduction over time in the pace in early-transitional countries is unexpected and calls
for an explanation. Second, on the end point of the transition, the evidence is less clear-
cut, but convergence to 2.1 seems unlikely in the next quarter-century even for countries
that are already in transition. It would be more plausible to assume considerable varia-
tion in levels of fertility at the end of transition in the next few decades, with some
countries dropping below replacement and others stalling at higher levels.
Table 1 Estimates of total fertility rate and annual pace of TFR decline for countries
with two DHS surveys between 1990 and 2000 and with TFR below 4 at the time of
the first survey
 Observed TFR Pace of decline
from DHS surveys DHS UN
Early 1990s Late 1990s estimates estimates
Bangladesh (1993/2000) 3.4 3.3 0.01 0.09
Colombia (1990/2000) 2.8 2.6 0.02 0.04
Dominican Rep. (1991/1996) 3.3 3.2 0.02 0.07
Egypt (1992/2000) 3.9 3.5 0.05 0.09
India (1993/1998) 3.4 2.8 0.11 0.08
Indonesia (1991/1997) 3.0 2.8 0.03 0.09
Kazakhstan (1995/1999) 2.5 2.1 0.11 0.06
Peru (1992/2000) 3.5 2.8 0.09 0.09
Turkey (1993/1998) 2.5 2.6 –0.02 0.07
Average 3.1 2.9 0.048 0.073
Source: DHS first country reports and interpolation from United Nations (2001)
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FERTILITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS
To obtain a better understanding of contemporary patterns of fertility transition,
it is useful to examine the relationship between fertility and socioeconomic indicators.
The following five conventional indicators are used for this purpose: life expectancy at
birth, percent literate among adults, real GDP per capita (log) adjusted for purchasing
power, percent of population in urban areas, and percent of labor force in agriculture
(United Nations 2001; World Bank 2000; Heston et al. 1995). Data for most of these
variables are available from 1960 to the early 1990s, and the analysis below is therefore
confined to this period.6 All countries for which these variables are available are in-
cluded in the analysis except the major oil exporters (Brunei, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates), whose highly unusual development experience is not
examined. In addition, crisis years defined by very large and sudden changes in life
expectancy are excluded (e.g., Cambodia in the 1970s).7
Figure 3 plots the relationship between TFR and life expectancy and includes all
observations (137 countries, with multiple observations per country from 1960–65 to
1990–95). The simple correlation between these variables is a highly significant –0.79.
Correlations between the TFR and the other four development indicators (not shown)
are also highly significant and in the expected direction although somewhat smaller in
size: percent literate, –0.73; GDP per capita, –0.68; percent urban, –0.63; and percent of
labor force in agriculture, 0.69.
The data in Figure 3 also demonstrate that the relationship between TFR and life
expectancy is nonlinear. At the lowest levels of life expectancy the TFR is high and
there is no significant correlation between the two. In contrast, at high levels of life
expectancy the TFR is strongly and inversely associated with life expectancy. Similar
nonlinear patterns of association exist for the other development indicators. To shed
light on this changing relationship we examine in greater detail the successive phases of
the transition. Three phases are distinguished below: 1) pretransition, covering all ob-
servations before the TFR reaches the 5 percent decline threshold, 2) transition onset
and early transition, covering the first decade after the year in which the threshold is
11
reached, and 3) mid and late transition, the remaining period with more than ten years
after transition onset.
Pretransition
In 1960–65 the large majority of developing countries had not yet entered the
transition. The average TFR in these pretransitional countries in the early 1960s was 6.7
with a standard deviation of 0.6. Regional averages were similar for Asia (6.5), Latin
America (6.6), and sub-Saharan Africa (6.7), but slightly higher in the Middle East/
North Africa (7.1). Regression analysis indicates no significant effects on fertility of
development indicators in countries with the lowest levels of development.8 Although
countries vary in their level of pretransitional fertility, there is usually little trend up or
down before the transition starts. The TFR can therefore be considered largely unre-
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Figure 3 Relationship between TFR and life expectancy for 137 developing
countries with observations from 1960–65 to 1990–95
Source: See text.
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sponsive to changes in development until the transition begins. This pattern of fertility is
consistent with the existence of natural fertility, defined as the fertility that prevails
when couples do not consciously limit the size of their families (Cleland 2001; Henry
1961; Knodel and van de Walle 1979). Fertility surveys in pretransitional countries have
confirmed that only a very small proportion of couples practice contraception (Curtis
and Neitzel 1996), and differences in fertility are caused primarily by differences in
proximate determinants other than contraception (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). This is-
sue is not discussed further because this study focuses on the later phases of the transi-
tion.
Transition onset
The transition has begun in 123 of the 137 developing countries included in this
analysis. The year of onset varied widely: 23 countries entered their transition before
1960, 38 in the 1960s, 32 in the 1970s, 23 in the 1980s, and 7 in the 1990s. The remain-
ing 14 countries will presumably also enter the transition eventually. As shown in Figure
1, the onset of a transition typically represents a break from the past, with the pace of
fertility decline sharply higher after than before the onset. In countries for which time
series of contraceptive use are available, a rise in contraceptive use from very low levels
coincides with the onset of the transition (Bongaarts and Johansson 2002; United Na-
tions 1999).
The transition onset occurs after a country’s level of development has risen for
some time. On average in the year of onset, life expectancy was 54.7 years, percent
literate 52.8, GDP per capita (log) 3.14, percent urban 32.8, and percent of labor force in
agriculture 57.5 (see last column of Table 2). There is, however, no well-defined thresh-
old of development that signals the start of a transition. In fact, levels of development at
time of onset vary considerably historically in Europe and in contemporary developing
countries. One cause of this variation is that the level of development at the time of
onset appears to have declined over time (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). This trend is
also evident in Table 2, which presents averages for development indicators in the year
of transition onset for groups of countries entering the transition in different decades
from the 1960s to the 1990s. For example, the average life expectancy in the year tran-
13
sitions started was 57.7 years in the 1960s, but it declined to 54.1 in the 1970s, 51.1 in
the 1980s, and 48.7 in the 1990s. Similarly, this average declined over time for percent
literate, GDP per capita, and percent urban and rose for percent of labor force in agricul-
ture. These effects are statistically significant for life expectancy, percent literate, and
GDP per capita.9 Apparently, the later in time a transition starts, the lower the average
development level at transition onset. It is unclear whether this trend will continue into
the future.
Early transition phase
Once a transition starts, it tends to continue. Reversals and plateaus are very
unusual in the early phases of the transition. The pace of decline is typically faster im-
mediately after onset than in any other phase of the transition. An earlier study of these
trends by Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) concluded that the initial pace of change in
fertility was not associated with the pace of development. However, the pace of initial
decline was positively associated with the level of development at the time of onset.
These findings are confirmed here with a more complete data set. For example, Figure 4
plots the annual decline in TFR in the decade after transition onset by level of life ex-
pectancy at the time of onset. The significant positive association between these vari-
ables indicates that when a country begins its transition at a low life expectancy, it has
on average a slower initial pace of fertility decline than a country with a high life expect-
ancy at the time of onset. Similar significant effects on the initial pace of decline are
found for level of literacy and percent of labor force in agriculture at the time of onset.10
Table 2 Average levels of development indicators in year of onset of transition by
decade in which transition occurred
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s All
Life expectancy (years) 57.7 54.1 51.1 48.7 54.7
Literacy (%) 61.6 52.2 44.9 41.3 52.8
GDP per capita (log $) 3.21 3.19 3.03 a 3.14
Urban population (%) 37.2 34.3 25.2 27.0 32.8
Labor force in agriculture (%) 50.3 57.1 68.2 a 57.5
aFewer than 5 observations
Source: See text.
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These findings are consistent with the previous observation (Figure 2) that the
pace in the initial transition stage has declined over time. Apparently, in later decades
countries enter the transition at lower levels of development, but for this reason the
initial pace is lower than for countries that entered the transition in earlier decades at
higher levels of development.
The key features of the early phases of the transition are summarized in Figure 5,
which presents stylized plots of typical trends in fertility for three groups of countries
with transitions starting in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The solid lines represent the
approximate observed average fertility trends for these three groups. The dashed lines
represent the simulated fertility trends that would have been observed if the groups
starting in the 1970s and 1980s had been exposed to the same average development
level at transition onset and had experienced the same initial pace of decline as observed
in the group starting in the 1960s. For example, line A plots the approximate observed
average trend for countries starting their transitions in the 1970s. If the transitions in this
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Figure 4 Pace of TFR decline in decade after transition onset by life expectancy in
year of onset
Source: United Nations 2001.
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group had started at a level of development and with a pace that was typical for the
1960s, their transitions would have started later (say around 1980 when their level of
development would have been higher than it was in the 1970s) and at a faster pace than
they actually experienced (compare dashed line A’ with solid line A). Similarly, if the
populations with transition onsets in the 1980s had followed average patterns of the
1960s, their transitions would have started considerably later (say in the 1990s) and at a
faster pace. Because the relatively early onset of transitions in the 1970s and 1980s is
associated with a slower initial pace, over time the observed fertility trends in these
groups of countries tend to converge to the levels that would have been observed with-
out these effects (i.e., the solid and dashed lines in Figure 5 converge). As a result, these
effects are important early in the transition, but their role diminishes over time.
An explanation for these at first puzzling trends in fertility in the early phases of
the transitions is likely to be found in diffusion and social interaction processes, which
Figure 5 Approximate fertility trends in observed and simulated transitions for
groups of countries with transition onset in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
Source: See text.
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interfere with a smooth adjustment of fertility to changing socioeconomic circumstances.
Diffusion refers here to the spread of information, ideas, and behaviors among individu-
als, communities, and countries; and social interaction refers to the fact that reproduc-
tive attitudes and behaviors of individuals can be influenced by the attitudes and behav-
iors of others. An extensive literature exists on this subject (Bongaarts and Watkins
1996; Caldwell 2001; Casterline 2001a, 2001b; Cleland 2001; Cleland and Wilson 1987;
Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Kohler 2001; Montgomery and Casterline 1996; Na-
tional Research Council 2001; Watkins 1986, 1987) and only a brief outline of the main
points is given here:
— The first key element of an explanation is an initial resistance to reproductive
change in pretransitional societies with natural fertility. Traditional norms and values
tend to support large families and to discourage the deliberate limitation of family size
through contraception. This resistance to change leads to a growing gap between actual
and desired family size when child mortality and desired family size decline with devel-
opment, thus building a potential for future fertility decline.
—As development proceeds, the desire for reproductive change becomes suffi-
ciently large and widespread that a few innovators adopt contraception—typically first
among highly educated and urban couples. Once begun, reproductive change spreads
rapidly as diffusion and social interaction processes reinforce rather than inhibit such
change. The cost of contraception (broadly defined to include social costs) drops. In
addition, diffusion and social interaction can alter couples’ evaluation of the costs and
benefits of childbearing, thus reducing fertility preferences. The combination of a sub-
stantial (and growing) existing demand for and a reduction in the cost of contraception
results in a “sharp acceleration in fertility decline that is a kind of ‘catching up’ as pent-
up desires for limiting fertility are released” (Casterline 2001a: 34). This initial fertility
decline is typically more rapid the more developed a society is at the time of onset
because higher levels of development are associated with lower desired family size and
hence with larger gaps between actual and desired behavior. And the more developed a
country, the more extensive the channels for social interaction and diffusion of innova-
tive ideas, information, and attitudes.
— Finally, social interaction among countries is an important cause of the reduc-
tion over time in the average development level at transition onset. The fact that some
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countries in the world or in a region have already entered a transition tends to facilitate
the onset in other countries that are still pretransitional. Interaction among countries
occurs through many channels including trade, exchange of technology, labor migra-
tion, tourism, and the media, all of which facilitate the spread of ideas and information
about the means for and desirability of family limitation. A large international effort to
implement family planning programs in many developing countries has also played an
important role because these programs give couples access to and information about
birth control methods.
While this general explanation for observed transition patterns is plausible, many
details remain to be settled and further research is needed to confirm its validity.
Mid and late transition phases
In the later phases of the transition, fertility behavior is more consistent with the
expectations of most demographic and economic theories of fertility (Becker 1991;
Bulatao and Lee 1983; Caldwell 1982; Easterlin 1975; Notestein 1953). According to
these theories, the main driving force of fertility transitions is a rise in the cost of chil-
dren and a decline in their value to parents as traditional agricultural societies are trans-
formed into modern industrial ones. This shifting balance of costs and benefits leads to
declines in desired family size and, with the implementation of these preferences through
contraception and abortion, to lower fertility. As a consequence, fertility levels are in-
versely related to development indicators.
This conclusion is supported by the regression results presented in Table 3. Five
development indicators and year of observation are the explanatory variables for the
level of the TFR.11 All observations from 1960–65 to 1990–95 in which a country is
more than a decade past the year of transition onset are included. The main findings
from this regression are:12
1) The coefficients for life expectancy and literacy are highly significant and
negative, implying that these development indicators are inversely related to fertility.
2) The effects of GDP per capita, percent urban, and percent of labor force in
agriculture are not significant.
3) Regional dummy variables for Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are
not significantly different from zero (Africa is reference region).
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 4) None of the dummy variables for year of observation is significant. This sug-
gests that the relationship between fertility and development does not vary with time.
(The fact that the coefficients for these dummy variables are positive and decline with
time leaves open the possibility of a slight downward drift over time in the TFR for
given levels of the development indicators.)
These findings support the view that human development (in particular, improve-
ments in health and education) is the most critical determinant of progress through the
fertility transition (Sen 1999). In fact, it is possible for fertility in poor populations to
drop to the replacement level provided literacy and life expectancy are high. Well-known
examples of this trend are Sri Lanka and the state of Kerala in India. It should be noted
that the two human development indicators included in this analysis (literacy and life
expectancy) were selected because long time series were available for a large number of
countries. It is possible that closely related variables such as child mortality or level of
school enrollment are equally or even more important determinants of fertility, but this
issue is not examined here in part owing to lack of data.
Reaching near-replacement fertility apparently requires high levels of human
development in most countries. To illustrate this point, consider the set of developing
countries that had life expectancy above 70 years combined with literacy above 90 per-
cent in the late 1990s. Only 20 out of 137 countries met these criteria. In this small
Table 3 Regression results (OLS) for total fertility rate and development indicators
for countries in mid or late transition (more than 10 years past transition onset)
Variable Coefficient t statistic Significance level
Life expectancy –0.104 –6.28 0.000
Percent literate –0.015 –3.02 0.003
GDP per capita (log) –0.157 –0.45 0.650
Percent urban 0.002 0.48 0.631
Percent labor in agriculture 0.004 0.68 0.498
Region = Asia –0.150 –0.63 0.527
Region = Latin America 0.433 1.92 0.056
Region = Middle East 0.445 1.71 0.089
Year = 1960–69 0.341 1.56 0.120
Year = 1970–79 0.200 1.22 0.222
Year =1980–89 0.175 1.32 0.187
Constant 11.57 8.10 0.000
R2 = 0.60
Source: See text.
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group of countries with high human development the TFR averaged 2.24 (i.e., near
replacement), average life expectancy was 74.5 years, and average literacy was 94.3
percent (see Table 4, first column). The finding that the fertility–development relation-
ship has not significantly shifted since the 1960s suggests that similarly high levels of
life expectancy and literacy will likely be needed to reach TFRs near replacement in the
future. Because the large majority of developing countries fall well short of these levels
of human development, considerable progress will have to be made before near-replace-
ment fertility becomes widespread.
It is of interest to compare these statistics for countries with high human develop-
ment with the same statistics for countries with below-replacement fertility in the late
1990s. Twenty-one countries had a TFR of 2.1 or less and their TFRs averaged 1.76. As
shown in the last column of Table 4 this low fertility was accompanied by about the
same levels of life expectancy and literacy as in the group of countries with high devel-
opment. However, fertility differed by 0.5 births––1.76 vs. 2.24—between the two groups
of countries. This difference is largely explained by the nature of countries with low
fertility. Populations that now have below-replacement fertility are a select group, in
which fertility is on average more responsive to socioeconomic changes than is the case
in countries with the same levels of development that have not reached the end of the
transition. Their experience is not a useful guide for future trends in other developing
countries. In particular, it is not possible to conclude that all or most developing coun-
tries will closely follow the trajectory of this small, selected subset of countries.
One reason why reaching replacement fertility is difficult is that it requires a high
level of birth control. The TFR at any point in time equals the sum of wanted and un-
wanted fertility. Even if wanted fertility declines to 2, a fairly typical level in developing
Table 4 Average levels of TFR, life expectancy, and literacy in countries with high
human development and in countries with low fertility, 1995–2000
20 countries with 21 countries with
 high human development low fertility
(life expectancy > 70 and literacy > 90) (TFR ≤ 2.1)
TFR (births per woman) 2.24 1.76
Life expectancy (years) 74.5 73.5
Literacy (%) 94.3 93.0
Sources: United Nations 2001, World Bank 2000.
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countries approaching the end of the transition, the overall level of fertility will be higher
because of unwanted childbearing. According to DHS surveys the unwanted TFR ranges
from a few tenths of a birth (e.g., in Indonesia) to nearly two births per woman (e.g., in
Bolivia) (Bankole and Westoff 1995). Ready access to family planning methods and
abortion services is needed to achieve low levels of unwanted childbearing. Reaching
replacement fertility requires a low desired family size and excellent control of fertility.
In the absence of either of these conditions, fertility will remain above replacement.
It should be noted that any analysis of levels and trends in the TFR can be con-
founded by so-called tempo effects, which are caused by a change in the timing of child-
bearing (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Bongaarts 1999). It is likely that these tempo
effects exist in many developing countries because the mean age at marriage and at first
birth is rising, but a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present study.
The role of family planning programs is not explicitly examined in the regression
summarized in Table 3 because reliable time series of program effort are not available
for the 1960s and 1970s. A separate regression (not shown) restricted to observations in
the early 1990s and with program effort score added as an explanatory variable yielded
a significant effect for program effort. This result confirms earlier studies which found
that these programs reduce fertility by assisting couples in implementing their fertility
preferences (Bongaarts 1997; Tsui 2001). A high-quality family planning program can
move a country closer to replacement fertility than would be expected from its level of
development alone. An example of this effect is found in Bangladesh, which has a TFR
of 3.3 despite scoring relatively low on most development indicators.
This review of the effects of development on fertility leads to the following ten-
tative conclusions. Although a decline in the demand for children is the main driving
force of the transition, each of the transition phases is characterized by a different pro-
cess. In the least-developed pretransitional societies, fertility is natural and initially un-
responsive to changes in development. In contrast, in the years immediately following
transition onset, fertility change is usually most rapid as diffusion and social interaction
processes reduce the cost of contraception and facilitate the establishment of new repro-
ductive attitudes and behaviors. These processes apparently have their main impact early
in the transition and as a result the pace of decline slows over time. Finally, as the
transition proceeds to its later stages, fertility is closely associated with development
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indicators, and continued fertility decline usually requires further development. This
does not imply that social interaction and diffusion effects are absent later in the transi-
tion, but rather that such effects are then closely tied to development.
PROJECTING FUTURE TRENDS IN FERTILITY
The past record of fertility transitions provides the main basis for making fertility
projections. Existing projections by the United Nations Population Division and other
agencies such as the World Bank (2000), IIASA (Lutz 1996), and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau (1999) generally assume that pretransitional countries will enter the transition in
the near future and that, once underway, a transition will continue until the TFR reaches
2.1 or less. The specifics of how these projections are made in each country are complex
and are not examined here, but a brief comment on the most widely used projections by
the UN is in order.
The UN’s methodology for projecting fertility in the large majority of developing
countries that have not yet completed their transition consists of three steps. First, avail-
able data from surveys, censuses, and other sources are analyzed to obtain an estimate of
the TFR for the most recent five-year period (i.e., 1995–2000 for the 2000 revision).
Next, the target year in which fertility reaches 2.1 is determined. This year is estimated
by taking into account “a range of socioeconomic factors, such as population policies
and programs, adult literacy, school enrollment levels, economic conditions (gross do-
mestic product or gross national product per capita), infant mortality and nuptiality, as
well as historical, cultural and political factors” (United Nations 1998). Finally, linear
interpolation between 1995–2000 and the target year yields the projected trajectory for
the TFR (except in countries that were still pretransitional in 1995–2000, which are
assumed to initiate a decline after 2005). The advantage of this procedure is that it is
simple to apply in a large number of countries. For a small number of countries the UN
makes more detailed assumptions and the resulting trajectory is nonlinear.
The main features of the UN projections of the TFR by country are evident from
an inspection of Figure 6, which plots expected trends from 2000 to 2050 for all devel-
oping countries with above-replacement fertility. A comparison of these trajectories with
the pattern experienced in the past by countries that entered the transition in the 1960s
(see Figure 1) reveals two main differences. First, after three decades of transition expe-
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rience, observed past fertility levels and trends are considerably more diverse than is
implied by the UN assumption of convergence to 2.1. Although the transitions plotted in
Figure 1 are not yet complete, it seems likely that substantial differences in fertility
levels will remain in the future. Some countries will end the transition below 2.1, while
others will end above 2.1. Although it is difficult to predict future fertility levels at the
end of ongoing transitions, it is reasonable to assume that fertility will vary with socio-
economic conditions. Second, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 the trend in fertility during
the transition is not linear. Instead of being constant (as the UN assumes for most coun-
tries), the observed pace of past transitions has been lower in the later than in the earlier
phases of the transition.
The medium variant of the UN projections expects the average TFR of develop-
ing countries to decline from 4.1 in 1995–2000 to 2.8 in 2020–25. It also expects a large
number of countries to end their transitions with a TFR of exactly 2.1 and only a small
Figure 6 Projections of TFR for developing countries, UN medium variant 2000–50
Source: United Nations 2001.
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number with a TFR below 2. Actual trends at the country level will no doubt deviate
from projected trends because of unexpected events and unpredictable errors. In addi-
tion, the foregoing analysis indicates that there will be some systematic errors. For ex-
ample, the number of countries with fertility below 2 will almost certainly be higher
than the UN projects, and, other things being equal, this would bring the average TFR
for 2020–25 below projected levels. However, the UN projections for most countries do
not assume a significant deceleration of the pace of fertility decline at the end of the
transition as has been observed in the past. This feature implies that actual fertility trends
in some countries will be higher than projected. The net result is a set of small positive
and negative errors in the projections that will partially offset one another. Since it is not
clear whether the positive errors will be larger or smaller than the negative ones, there is
no reason to conclude that the UN projections on average are too high or too low over
the next quarter-century.
CONCLUSION
Assuming that the past record of fertility transition will be repeated, at least in
broad outline, and assuming continued development, the following trends can be ex-
pected in the next few decades:
—The small number of countries that are still pretransitional will likely enter the
transition. When this will happen depends on achievement of some socioeconomic
progress, but the level of development required for entering the transitions has been
dropping.
— Fertility decline will proceed relatively rapidly for countries in the early phases
of the transition. The pace of this early decline will be lower in the future because future
transitions are expected to start at lower levels of development than in the past. Effec-
tive family planning programs assist couples in preventing unplanned pregnancies, and
hence speed up a population’s progress through the transition.
—As countries approach the later stages of the transition, the pace of decline will
slow down. The main reason for expecting this deceleration is that diffusion and social
interaction processes accelerated the decline early in the transition. Once this process
has largely run its course, fertility late in the transition becomes more closely tied to
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level of socioeconomic development. Rapid fertility decline then usually requires rapid
development. Increases in life expectancy and literacy appear to be particularly condu-
cive to fertility decline.
The wide variation in the level and pace of change that has characterized fertility
in the past will no doubt be observed in the future. As a consequence, the TFRs of
countries in 2025 will likely vary from less than 2 to well above 3. It would not be
surprising if fertility in a nontrivial number of developing countries were to stall above
replacement for a few decades. Past examples of such a pattern are found in Argentina
and Uruguay. These two countries began their transitions in the first half of the twenti-
eth century, and in the 1950s their TFRs had declined to about 3. Since then fertility has
changed very little and was still above 2.5 in 1995–2000. The apparent stalling of fertil-
ity in the 1990s in a number of countries with DHS surveys supports this conclusion.
The future course of fertility depends crucially on progress in human develop-
ment. The recent experience of countries with high levels of development suggests that
life expectancy near 75 years combined with literacy near 95 percent is needed on aver-
age to approach replacement. A strong commitment to human development can lead to
much progress in literacy and life expectancy in a relatively short time. It will be a
challenge, however, for many countries to reach these high levels of human develop-
ment in the next quarter-century. For example, the medium variant of the UN population
projections expects unweighted average life expectancy to reach only 69 years in 2020–
25. The UN does not project literacy levels but average literacy will probably fall short
of 95 percent. The implication is that average fertility can be expected to remain signifi-
cantly above replacement until at least 2025.
This conclusion is consistent with the UN medium variant projections, which
expect the unweighted average TFR of all developing countries to decline at a modest
pace to 2.8 in 2020–25. Although the preceding analysis has identified factors that will
make these projections too high for some countries and too low for others, the average
trend for the next quarter-century seems about right. The proportion of developing coun-
tries with fertility below 2—currently one in ten—will no doubt rise over time, but it
will almost certainly remain substantially less than one-half by 2020–25.
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1 In some countries fertility fluctuated so that the TFR fell below the 5 percent
threshold initially but rebounded, before subsequently again dropping below this
threshold. For this study the most recent observed year of reaching the 5 percent
threshold is used as the transition year.
2 For example, for the post-1975 period, a country in transition in 1975 contributes
four observations with TFRs for 1975–80, 1980–85, 1985–90, and 1990–95 and
corresponding pace estimates from 1975–80 to 1980–85, from 1980–85 to 1985–
90, from 1985–90 to 1990–95, and from 1990–95 to 1995–2000. The fact that
some countries contribute more observations than others could lead to a bias, but
this bias is minimized by controlling for the level of the TFR in Figure 2.
3 This finding is consistent with Casterline (2001a), who reported that national
fertility declines in the first ten years of the transition proceeded more rapidly in
the 1960s than in later decades.
4 Further analysis shows no significant trend since 1975.
5 In countries with more than two surveys in the 1990s, the first and last were used.
6 The percent literate among adults was available only for the period 1970–98.
Since this variable changes only slowly over time, estimates were made for the
1960s by logistic backward extrapolation.
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7 Crisis periods are defined as quinquennia during which the change in life expect-
ancy was more than three standard deviations from the average pace of change in
life expectancy for all countries and periods.
8 Results are based on fixed-effects regressions with observations limited to years
with the lowest levels of each development indicator (life expectancy <45, per-
cent literate <25, log of GDP/capita <2.7, percent urban <10, and percent of labor
force in agriculture >90).
9 Based on OLS regressions with controls for region (Asia, Latin America, Middle
East/North Africa, with sub-Saharan Africa as reference region).
10 OLS regressions of the decline in TFR in the decade after transition onset on the
level of development indicators in the year of transition onset (with controls for
region) show statistically significant effects for life expectancy, percent literate,
and percent in agriculture, but not for GDP per capita and percent urban. OLS
regressions of the decline in TFR in the decade after transition onset on the change
in development indicators in the same decade (with control for region) show no
statistically significant effects for change in life expectancy, literacy, percent in
agriculture, and percent urban.
11 The relationship between TFR and the socioeconomic measures is likely to be
nonlinear at very high levels of development because fertility cannot continue to
fall indefinitely as development proceeds. This issue is not examined further be-
cause very few populations have reached this endpoint in the transition.
12 A fixed-effects regression that controls for unobserved country variables and us-
ing the same explanatory variables gave very similar results: significant negative
effects for life expectancy and literacy; no significant effects for GDP per capita,
percent of labor force in agriculture, and the dummy variables for year of obser-
vation. The only difference from the OLS results presented in Table 3 is that the
effect of percent urban is significant and negative. A test for interactions between
development measures and year found no significant effects.
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